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In the 
Supreme Cottrt of the State of Utah 
ALBE I{T J. COPE, i\rhninistrator de 
bonis non of the Estate of Francis 
Cope, Deceased, 
Plai,ntiff and Appellant, 
~rl~~RLIN R. LYBBERT, Adminis-
trator of the Estate of \Villiam P. 
Epperson, deceased; ALLAN SHOTT, 
JR., ELOISE B. SHOTT; and ADEL-
PHINE COPE Sl TDBURRY, 
.A.drlitional Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
BOUNTIFUL LIVESTOCK COM-
pANY, DA "'\TIS COUNTY, a muni-
cipal corporation, BRYANT JAC-
OBS, Treasurer of Davis County, 
State of Utah, SALT LAKE PIPE-
LINE COMPAN\T, a Nevada corpo-
ration, and SALT LAI{:E REFINING 
CO:JIP ANY, a Nevada corporation, 
Defendants 01nd Respondents. 
Case No. 
9531 
BRIEF O:B., RESPONDENTS 
BOUNTIFUL LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
SALT LAKE PIPELINE C0~1P ANY, AND 
SALT LAKE REFINING COMPANY. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
These respondents do not dispute those facts as be-
tween them and appellants as set forth in appellant's 
brief. Such statement is, however, insufficient to enable 
the Court properly to understand the nature of the entire 
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case and to make a proper disposition of the same. For 
this reason, the following statement is made. 
The facts are not in dispute. Three cases are actually 
involved here. The essential facts are the same in each 
case and for brevity we will treat them as one. The plain-
tiffs are the successors in interest of prior owners of real 
property in Davis County, Utah. No taxes upon such 
premises have been paid by plaintiffs or their prede-
cessors in interest since 1932 and for all practical pur-
poses the property was abandoned by them. Auditor's 
deeds were issued to Davis County in 1937. Davis County 
desired to place the property on the tax rolls and in 1943 
entered into a contract to sell the same. The contract was 
made with one David E. Howard on behalf of Bountiful 
Livestock Company. David E. Howard was originally 
joined herein as a party defendant but died during the 
pendency of the action. On October 18, 19±±, the purchase 
price of the property was paid and the same \Yas con-
veyed by Davis County to Bountiful Livestock Company. 
A portion of the property \Yas, on February 11, 1956, 
sold and conveyed by the livestock company to Salt Lake 
Pipeline Company, \vhich, in turn, on Xovember 21, 
1956, conveyed to Salt Lake Refining Con1pany. Bounti-
ful Livestock Company \Vent into possession of the prop-
erty in 1943 and has re1nained in possession and except 
as to the parcel sold to the pipeline con1pany has con-
tinually used the premises for its livestock operations 
since that date. All taxes levied upon the premises have 
been paid by Bountiful Livestock Co1npany and its suc-
cessor in interest since 1944. (Deposition 1-21, R. 171-
172.) 
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At the tin1e of the sale to Bountiful Livestock Com-
pany in 19-!3, the Board of Co1nmissioners of Davis 
County consisted of three Inembers. One of the members 
'vas Amasa Howard. He "·a~ a brother of David llo,vard 
and was in 1943 a director and president of BountifuL 
Livestock Company and the owner of approximately 
t"·enty per cent of its stock. At the time of the offer 
of purchase in 1943, the County Commissioners inspected 
the property involved and thereafter by unanimous vote 
approved the sale to the livestock company. The sale was 
1nade at the fair value of the property. Amasa Howard 
'vas not chairman of the Board of County Commissioners. 
He did not move for the approval of the sale and has not 
profited frorn the transaction. (Deposition 1-21, R. 171-
172.) 
The complaints of the plaintiffs are uruque. They 
are not in the form of actions to quiet title or for eject-
Inent. The plaintiffs apparently recognized the control-
ling effect of certain statutes hereinafter considered 
and sought to avoid such statutes by attempting to 
ground their actions under the Declaratory Judgments 
.._\ct. They do not allege a controversy or any justiciable 
issue usually deemed necessary to found an action under 
such act. They affirmatively allege that the livestock 
company took possession of the property at the time of 
sale, and has ever since the sale, had the use, benefit and 
occupation of the premises. As we understand, the con-
tentions of the plaintiffs, they proceed upon the theory 
that the tax sale proceedings under which Davis County 
acquired its tax title were a nullity; that the deed from 
Davis County to the livestock company was likewise a 
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nullity; that the plaintiffs are entitled to the value of 
the use and occupation of the premises from the live-
stock co1npany and that their only obligation may be to 
pay some taxes to Davis County. It is suggested that the 
actions are in the nature of equitable suits to redeem 
the premises, but the allegations of the complaints are 
not framed in the language usually ernployed in suits 
in equity. Whatever the nature of the actions may be 
construed to be, these plaintiffs cannot avoid the con-
trolling effect of the statutes and principles of law here 
considered and this case must be determined by the ap-
plication of such statutes and principles. (R. 1-5, 24-25, 
41, 46-48.) 
The position of these defendants in this rather conl-
plicated case has been that: (i) The deed from Davis 
County to the livestock comp·any is valid. ( ii) If there 
be any invalidity in the deed the same is voidable and not 
void. (iii) If any claim exists to set the deed aside such 
clai1n is held by Davis County and not by these plain-
tiffs. ( iv) Because of the controlling effect of our stat-
utes of limitations and adverse possession, plaintiffs have 
no right in any event to recover. The defendants, Salt 
Lake Pipeline Company, and Salt Lake Refining Conl-
pany, also assert that they are innocent purchasers for 
value without notice of any defect in the Davis County 
deed. Ho,vever this defense 'Yill not be reached in the 
disposition of plaintiffs' claims. The defendant, Davis 
County, admits the facts herein set forth, but as against 
the claim of plaintiffs pleads in bar the statutes herein 
considered. (Transcript 1-21.) 
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The issues involved here as between the plaintiffs 
and the defendants \vere first fully explored by the trial 
court on plaintiffs' n1otion for summary judgment. (R. 
7 -t--75) Briefs "·ere subrnitted on the issues involved un-
der such rnotion. (R. 1~3-14-t) Plaintiffs' briefs are made 
a part of the record, but the briefs of defendants are for 
soine reason omitted. X evertheless, the trial court con-
sidered all the issues and denied plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 149) The matter then came on 
for hearing on pretrial. These defendants 'vould have 
preferred to have considered the issues in the order in-
dicated above, however the trial court preferred to pass 
directly to the question of whether the deed was voidable 
or void. (Transcript 1-21) The defendants did not, of 
course, in submitting such issue, concede that the deed 
was in any manner invalid. The trial court upon con-
sideration of the matter determined that the plaintiffs 
had no basis for recovery in any event and entered the 
judgment of dismissal from 'vhich this appeal is taken. 
(R.170-175) 
By cross complaint Davis County asserts against 
its co-defendants the invalidity of the deed to the live-
stock company. These defendants, as against such cross 
complaint, assert the validity of the deed, statutes of 
limitations, and of adverse possession, estoppel, and as 
to the pipeline company and its grantee the further de-
fense that they were innocent purchasers for value with-
out notices of any claims of Davis County. (R. 12-15, 
18-21, 27-34, 89-98) 
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Appellants seems to contend that the trial court held 
that Davis County had the right to set aside the deed 
to the livestock company. The record is clearly to the. 
contrary. The only issues determined were under the 
complaint. No issues have been framed by the Court un-
der the cross complaint, and the trial court very carefully 
reserved all issues as between Davis County and its co-
defendants. Upon the trial of that phase of the case, 
these defendants will assert every defense available to 
then1 under the facts and the issues there presented. (R. 
170-177) 
We are convinced that the judgn1ent of the trial 
court is necessarily compelled by the facts in this case 
and fully disposes of the entire case as bet\\Teen the plain-
tiffs and the defendants. "\Y.hile the issue for immediate 
consideration before the court on pretrial was whether 
at the suit of plaintiffs the deed to the livestock company 
'vas voidable or void, the judgn1ent of the court, being 
for dismissal of the action necessarily encompasses any 
question as to the right of the plaintiffs to recover. The 
findings of the trial court are sufficient to support a 
complete disposition of this case, (R. 170-175) and inas-
Inuch as there are no issues of fact \Yhich would be Ina-
terial to such a determination, \Ye think it is essential 
that all of the questions \Yhich Inight in any event arise 
in this case be explored and the entire matter be pre-
sented to this Court in order that as bet"Teen the plain-
tiffs and all defendants this 1natter 1nay be laid at rest. 
For this reason, \Ve have undertaken in this brief to ex-
press our vie\vs on each issue \Yhirh may be necessary 
fully to dispose of plaintiffs' clai1n. 
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ST:\ TE~II~~XT OF POL~TS 
I)<> I :\T~ I. 
AT THE St~rrl, OF PJ_J .. \INTIB.,FS THE DEED 
F~H<>~I 1)~\ \'"IS COlTXT,\'" TO BOtT:KTIFl~I~ 
I~ L \'" I~~srr< )C 1\: CO:JI J> """:\KY IS \'~\LID. 
(a) The Penalt~~ of the Statute Tnvolved Falls 
upon the Individual, not upon the Deed. 
(b) The \'"ote of An1asa Howard \Vas Not Xeces-
sary to Authorize the Sale to Bountiful 
Livestock Company. 
POINT II. 
IF THE DEED FRO:.\I DA \:IS COlT~T1~ TO 
BOTTNTIFlJL LI\TESTOCI( COMPANY BE IN 
ANY l\l.t\~NER IN\~ALID, IT IS AT l\fOST 
VOIDABLE AND NOT VOID. 
POINT III. 
IF THE DEED FROl\1 DA \'IS COl~NTY TO 
Bor:K1,IFUL LI\TESTOCK CO~IP AXY IS 
\'"OID .. \BLE, PijAINTIFFS H A\'" E NO 
CAUSE OF AC 1TION TO SET THE DEED 
ASIDE. 
POINT IV. 
IN NO E\'"E:NT ~IA Y THE PLAINTIFFS RE-
COVER IN THIS CASE. 
(a) Plaintiffs Can Succeed Only on the Strength 
of Their O"rn Title. 
(b) Whether the Deed from Davis County to 
Bountiful Livestock Company is \ .. oid or 
,~ oidable, Plaintiffs are no'v Barred from 
Instituting this Action by Reason of the 
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Provisions of the Special Statutes of Limit-
tion Relating to Tax Titles. 
(c) In Any Event, the Deed from Davis County 
to Bountiful Livestock Company is a Writ-
ten Instrument upon which Bountiful Live-
stock Company and its Successors can found 
a Defense based upon Adverse Possession. 
(d) Plaintiffs are now Barred by the General 
Adverse Possession Statutes. 
(e) The Bar which Prevents Plaintiffs from Re-
covery against Bountiful Livestock Com-
pany, Salt Lake Pipeline Company and Salt 
Lake Refining Company Likewise Bars the 
Plaintiffs from any Recovery against Davis 
County. 
ARGUnfEXT 
POINT I. 
AT THE SUIT OF PLAINTIFFS THE DEED 
FROM DAVIS COuNTY TO BOUNTIFUL 
LIVESTOCK C0~1:PANY IS \TALID. 
The deed from Davis County to Bountiful Livestock 
Company is valid for two reasons: 
(a) The Penalty of the Statute Involved Falls 
upon the Individual, not upon the Deed. 
(b) The Vote of Amasa Ho,vard Was X ot N eces-
sary to Authorize the Sale to Bountiful 
Livestock Comp,any. 
Statutes which deal \Yith the subject of the interest 
of a public officer in transactions 'vith the public body 
are of two kinds, namely, (i) those 'vhich impose a penal-
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ty upon the officer for violation of the statute, and (ii) 
those which invalidate the transaction. 
Section 17-5-10, lT tah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
hibits a board member from being interested in trans-
actions \Yith his county. Penalties are imposed for viola-
tion of this section under other statutory provisions, in-
cluding those providing for removal from office. Thus 
the offending officer may be subjected to punishment. 
The statute does not, however, render invalid the trans-
action. 
The statute here involved relating to county offi-
cers should be compared with Section 10-6-38, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, relating to city officers, which contains 
the prohibitive provisions and also pTovides that any 
prohibited contract shall be void. 
Section 17-5-10 was construed by this Court in Engle 
v. District Court of Carbon County, 96 Utah 245, 85 
P.2d 627, where accusation proceedings taken against the 
County Commissioner Engle for violation of said section 
were sustained. The decision in that case demonstrates 
the operation of the statute. If the c·ounty Commissioner 
Amasa Howard in voting for the sale of the premises 
to Bountiful Livestock Company violated the pTovisions 
of said section, then Howard may have been guilty of an 
offense for which appropriate proceedings could have 
been taken against him. This remedy against the indi-
vidual, however, is wholly separate and distinct from 
the transaction itself, and the personal liability of the 
officer does not destroy the validity of the deed to 
Bountiful Livestock Company. 
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This principle is demonstrated in the case of Mar-
shall v. Elmwood City Borongh (Pa.) 41 Atl. 994. In that 
case I\Iarshall brought an action against the City to re-
strain it from paying out money under a contract with 
Elmwood Water Company. The fact '"as that one of the 
1nembers of the Borough Council, at the time of the enact-
ment of an ordinance for a contract 'vith the \\Tater Com-
pany, was disqualified from voting because he was then 
secretary of the Water Company. The statute involved 
prescribed penal consequences in such a situation. The 
court pointed out, however, that those consequences 
were personal to the offender and did not in terms ex-
tend to or embrace the legal effect of the municipal con-
tract in which he participated. In sustaining the contract, 
the court at page 995 of the Atlantic Reporter employs 
the following language: 
"The contract inherently 'vas a perfectly legi-
timate contract, 'vhich the parties "~ere at liberty 
to make. Hence the authorities cited for the ap-
pellant in which contracts 1nade by a municipality 
with a prohibited person, such as a n1ember of 
councils or a member of a purchasing comn1ittee, 
or by a county board of co1n1nissioners "ith one 
of its o'vn body, are held to be invalid, haYe no 
application. * * * The Penal Code of 1860 pro-
hibited a member of a 1nunicipality fro1n being 
interested in a contract for furnishing supplies 
or materials to the corporation, and i1nposed per-
sonal penalties upon hi1n if he Yiolated the act, 
and to these penalties he is, of course, liable. 
But the invalidity of such a contract is not de-
clared as a penal consequence, or as any conse-
quence of such a situation." 
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In Grady v. City of IJi·vingston, (Mont.) 141 P. 2d 
:3-t:G, actions "·pre brought by tax paying plaintiffs to 
recover on behalf of the City of Livingston money paid 
by the ( 1ity to various corporate defendants. The money 
sought to be recovered 'vas for merchandise sold and de-
livered to the City by the defendants. At the time the 
goods were bought by the City, certain members of 
the City Council were employees or officials of the de-
fendant corporations. The trial court refused recovery 
and the Supreme Court in a divided opinion affirmed. 
The Montana statute was much like ours except that it 
contained provisions that contracts made in violation 
of the statute could be avoided at the instance of any 
party except the officers interested therein. The follo·wr-
ing language employed in the opinion of Mr. Justice 
Morris, appearing at page 352 of the Pacific Reporter 
is rna terial here : 
". . . We do not think there is any rule of 
equity that ernpowers any court to penalize a cor-
poration on the ground that one of its agents, 
while serving a municipality, violated his trust as 
an officer of the municipality. The respectiv~ 
obligations of the official to his employer on the 
one hand and to the municipality on the other are 
separate and distinct. There is no relation what-
ever between the t'vo. The employer is no more 
blamable for the action of the employee public 
official than the city. The remedy for violation 
of either does not depend in the slightest degree 
upon the other. The code sections mentioned and 
section 10827 'vere obviously intended to punish 
and to purge the public service of persons who 
betray the public trust reposed in them, not to 
confiscate the property of business concerns, 
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whose employees they happen to be. There is an-
other, and a distinct remedy for the latter.'' 
The vote of Amasa l-Io,\·ard 'vas not necessary to 
the sale. The vote of other Comn1issioners was sufficient. 
The transaction may therefore be sustained. See Mar-
shall v. Elwood City Borough, supra, where the court 
at page 995 of the Atlantic Reporter observed as follows: 
~'The council consisted of six members, of 
whom five were present when the ordinance in 
question was proposed. The whole five voted in 
favor of the ordinance, one of them being l\Ir. Roe-
lofs. Four votes were a clear majority of the 
whole number of councilmen. None of these four 
members was disqualified, and the ordinance was 
passed by a majority of the \vhole number of meln-
bers without any regard being had to the vote of 
Mr. Roelofs. IIis vote, therefore, had no legal 
efficacy in the passage of the ordinance. It was 
passed by the qualified vote of the other four 
members. Does an ordinance which has enough 
legal votes to sustain it become illegal because 
there were other persons - one or more -voting 
in its favor who were not qualified to vote 1 It 
would be an astonishing proposition to submit that 
an ordinance in a body of fifty or a hundred mem-
bers, which \vas passed by a considerable majority 
of perfectly qualified vote~, should be declared il-
legal because it had received the supporting vote 
of one member who \Ya~ disqualified. \\~ e have 
not been referred to any decision of any court 
holding such a doctrine, and \Ve cannot imagine 
that any such decision can be found. We kno\v of 
no reason, in the present case, ·w·hy the in-
valid vote of one member of the council should 
be held to invalidate the perfectly legal vote of the 
other four 1nembers." 
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Counsel for appellant~ rite and rely on City of San 
Diego v. San Diego /..~ Los L1ngeles Rrt?'lroad Con71Hli~Jf, 
(Cal.) ·~4 Cal. 106. In that case, ho,wPver, it appears 
that two of the three me1nbers of the Board of Trustees 
of the City voted in favor of making a grant of land to 
the Railroad Company and the third member of the board 
voted against ~uch transfer. One of the two board men1-
bers voting in favor of the transfer was a stockholder 
and director of the Railroad Company. The court said: 
"We do not doubt that a majority of the 
trustees might execute the power but the question 
is, whether Sherman, \vho \\~as a stockholder and 
director of the Railroad Company, could be one 
of that majority." 
Upon the grounds hereinabove set forth \\~e submit 
the deed to the Livestock c·ompany is valid. 
POINT II. 
IF T·HE DEED FRO~f DAVIS COUNTY TO 
BOUNTIFUL LIVESTOCK COMPANY BE IN 
ANY MANNER INVALID, IT IS AT MOST 
VOIDABLE AND NOT "\TOID. 
Before proceeding "~ith a consideration of the cases 
in support of the proposition stated above, it is well to 
observe again the background of the transaction under 
attack. The record indicates that the parties proceeded 
in good faith to enter into the contract in 1943 and to ex-
ecute the deed in 1944. The price paid represented the 
fair value of the property. Davis County executed and 
delivered the deed and received the consideration there-
for, and has for some sixteen years collected and received 
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taxes from the grantee or its successors. (Deposition 1-
21) It was to the benefit and advantage of Davis County 
to restore the property to the tax rolls and there is no 
doubt that the County had the power to sell the property 
as it did. It had the power to vest title in the purchaser 
and the grantee corporation had the power to take and 
receive title to real property. The only impairment in th,) 
entire transaction lies in the fact that Amasa Howard, 
one of the Commissioners of Davis County, was an officer 
and director of the livestock company. L"nder the circum-
stances, in view of the long lapse of time and benefits 
which have accrued to Davis County, it \\Tould require 
the rnost impelling reasons to invoke the harsh and puni-
tive rule that the deed to the livestock company \Ya~ 
a complete and utter nullity and that no title \vhatever 
passed to the purchaser Bountiful Livestock Company. 
There is no hard and fast rule as to \Yhether a deed 
rnay be voidable or void. The ans\ver depends not only 
upon all the facts and rircurnstances involved in a case. 
the statutes under \vhich the pro blern arises, but also 
upon the parties who assert the contention. Thus it rnay 
very well be that as to some persons and under son1e 
circumstances the deed rnay be valid, but as to other 
persons and under other circumstances the deed rnay be 
voidable or void. This is particularly true in a situation 
such as that presented here, \Yhere the plaintiffs seek to 
set aside a deed not on behalf of the County, \vho \vas 
a party to the transaction~ but against the County and 
adverse to it, in the vary san1e action in \Yhich the County 
itself seeks to set aside the deed upon the basis of its own 
independent clain1. l\foreover, there is the utmost con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
fusion in the deci~ion8 in the use of the ter1ns '·void" and 
"voidable." In a strietP:--;t sense a void instrument is a 
nullity, \vhile a voidable instrument is one \vhich is valid 
until set aside b~; one having a right to do so. It i ~ seldo111 
that an instrtnnent is a complete nullity as to all persons 
and tmder all circumstances. In n1ost situations \\~her0 
the courts use the term Bvoid" they actually mean void-
able at the suit of a party having a right to set the in-
strument aside. 
These principles have been announced in a great 
many cases. We think there is no benefit to the Court 
in extensive citations of such cases. The most careful 
statement of the la\\~ ""hich we have found is that set 
forth in State v. Riclun ond (New Hampshire) 26 N.H. 
( 6 Fost.) 232-237, as follo,vs : 
"There is in our books great looseness and no 
little confusion in the use of the terms 'void' and 
'voidable,' gro\Ying, perhaps, in some degree out 
of the in1perfeetion of our language. There are 
at least four kinds of defects which are included 
under these expressions, while \Ye have but those 
t""O terms to express them all. 2 Kent, Co1n1n. 
~3-l:; 7 Bac. Abr. 64, ,, ... oid and , ... oidable'; 22 \Tin. 
Abr. 12, '\T oid and \: oidable'; J ac. La\v Diet. 
', ... oid.' (1) Proceedings may be wholly void, 
""ithout force or effect as to all persons and for 
all purposes, and incapable of being or being made 
otherwise. This is the broadest sense of the \Yord, 
but the cases which fall \vithin this signification 
are probably not numerous. (2) Things may be 
void as to some persons and for some purposes, 
and as to them incapable of being otherwise, \vhich 
are yet valid as to other persons and effectual for 
other purposes; as a deed executed by an idiot, 
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and by others capable of contracting, 1nay be 
void as to the idiot, and yet binding as to the 
others. An instrument in form of a deed, but 
without a seal, may be void as a conveyance, and 
, yet be binding for some other purposes. ( 3) 
Things may be void as to all persons and for all 
purposes, or as to some persons and for some 
purposes, though not so as to others, until they 
are confirmed; but, though said to be void, they 
are not so in the broadest sense of that term, be-
cause they have a capacity of being confirmed, 
and after such confinnation they are binding. For 
this kind of defect our language affords no dis-
tinctive term. They are strictly neither void-
that is, mere nullities-nor voidable, because they 
do not require to be avoided, but until confirmed 
they are without validity. They are usually spoken 
of as void; and, as usage is the only law of lan-
guage, they are so called correctly. It is, there-
fore, always to be considered an open question, 
to be decided by the connection and othenvise, 
'vhether the term 'void' is used in a given instance 
in one or the other of these in some respects dis-
similar senses. ( 4) Contracts and proceedings 
are properly called voidable which are valid and 
effectual until they are avoided by some act. 
Prima facie they are valid. but they are subject 
to defects, of which some person has a right to 
take advantage, ""ho 1nay by proper proceedings 
for that purpose entirely defeat and destroy them. 
Voidable contracts are in general .. perhaps al"~ays~ 
like the last class referred to, capable of confirma-
tion by the party "~ho has the right to avoid them. 
1 Bouv. Inst. S 1321. ~tatters 'Yhich are properly 
voidable are very commonly spoken of as void. 
Smith v. Saxton, 23 :1\lass. ( 6 Pick.) 483, +87. Tech-
nically and legally speaking, they are improperly 
so called. But the 'vord 'void' is so often used 
by good writers, and even by legal "~ri ters, in the 
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sense of invalid, inpffectual, or not binding, that 
it can hardl)T be said that this is not a correct 
and legitimate use o i' the term. Our books are full 
of examvles of the loose and inaccurate use of 
these word~, and n1any difficult questions have 
grown out of this circumstance. They are so con1-
mon that \Ye think no strong inference can be 
justly dra"\vn fro1n the unqualified use of these 
word~ as to the particular kind or degree of in-
validity· 1neant, \Yhere the attention of the court 
is not clearly directed to that point." 
The principles stated above are summarized by the 
Supreme Court of the l;nited States and other author-
ities as follows: 
"It is rarely that things are 'vholly 'void' and 
"\vithout force and effect as to all persons and for 
all purposes, and incapable of being made other-
wise. Things are 'voidable' which are valid and 
effectual until they are avoided by son1e act; \vhile 
things are often said to be 'void' "\vhich are 'vithout 
validity until confirmed. Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 
29 S. Ct. 416, 417, 212 1T.S. 542, 53 L. Ed. 6-1--t, cit-
ing 8 Bac. Abr. : E,vell v. Daggs, 2 S. Ct. 408, 
108 U.S. 143, 27 L. Ed. 682; Weeks v. Bridgman, 
16 S. Ct. 72, 7 4, 159 U.S. 541, 40 L. Ed. 253, 255; 
Louisville '.rrust Co. v. Comingor, 22 S. Ct. 293, 
296, 184 U.S. 18, 25, 46 L. Ed. 413, 416." 
It is in the light of these principles and the facts 
involved that the question must be considered. 
The situation presented here is quite analogous to 
that involving an executed contract. ~Iany cases of such 
character have been presented to the courts and the rules 
frequently announced to the effect that 'vhere the con-
tract has been executed and the municipality has received 
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all of the benefits thereunder, the person \vho has con-
ferred those benefits \vhile he 1nay be unable to sue dir-
ectly upon the contract, may nevertheless recover in 
equity the reasonable value of the benefit conferred upon 
the municipality. Such a result could be reached upon 
the theory that the contract is voidable only and not 
completely void. 
In Town of Hartley v. Floete Lu1nlJer Co., (lo\\Ta), 
171 N.W. 183, a stockholder director and manager of a 
corporation and who was also a member of the City 
Council voted to purchase merchandise from the corpora-
tion. The merchandise was duly purchased and used by 
the municipality and warrants issued in pay1nent of the 
materials furnished. After the City had received the 
materials and used them, a suit \Yas brought by the Town 
Council to cancel the warrants in the hands of the Com-
pany. The defendant Company in a cross-petition sought 
to recover the fair value of the goods sold. This, then, 
presented a situation \Vhere recovery \Yas not sought on 
the contract itself but for the fair value of the goods sold. 
The court had occasion to revie\\T the general la\\T on the 
subject of the enforcement of such contracts, announcing 
the principles \vhich we have considered here, and then 
ntade the following observations: 
"The thought running through the cases seems 
to be that one entrusted 'vith the business of 
others cannot be allo\Yed to n1ake such business 
an object of pecuniary profit to himself. X othing 
can be added to \Yhat has been alreadY said bY 
this Court on this question. Such contracts ar·e 
voidable at common la\Y. This Court has refused 
to recognize the1n or enforce the1n. * * * But the 
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question still remains: Is this defendant con1-
pany 'vithout remedy in a court of equity. The 
contract, it is true, 'vas made in violation of publi(• 
policy, and the contract, as such, "Tas not enforce-
able in law or equity, and, ""'hile executor~~, an~r 
attempt to enforce it "'ould have been enjoined. 
It was a voidable contract, and, upon proper sho,,T_ 
ing, the courts refused to recognize and enforce 
it. '\: e have, however, this situation before us: 
The plaintiff city acted through its coun;-;el - a 
body of men of its O\vn choosing. The things in-
volved in this suit were needed by the city. The 
city had a right to, and because of its needs it \Yas 
its duty, to purchase these things some\vhere. 
The purchase 'vas neither against the statute nor 
contrary to public policy. The purchase was not 
'vrongful in itself. It only became unenforceable 
because of the relationship of the parties to the 
transaction." 
In Mares v. Janutka, (~finn.) 264 N.W. 222, residents 
and taxpayers of the City of ~Iontgomery sued to compel 
the defendant to restore to the City Treasury certain 
money received by him for the sale of merchandise and 
material to the City during the time he was a member 
of the City Council. There appeared to be no doubt that 
the defendant as a member of the City Council, made 
sales to the City for merchandise at a fair price. The 
City used the merchandise, obtained the benefit of, and 
paid for the same. The plaintiffs, being taxpayers, 
brought to suit to compel the defendant to pay back the 
money. The court refused to permit the recovery and 
stated the rule as follows: 
"When such officer sells to his municipality 
property "Tithin its municipal powers to acquire 
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and use, and it is so arq uired and used, liability 
may be enforced quasi ex contractu, but in no 
event beyond the value of the property to the 
municipality.'' 
The contract between the City and the officer was void-
able but not void. Had it been utterly void a court of 
equity "\vould not have permitted retention of the selling 
price of the property. 
In Trainerv. Wolfe, (Pa.), 21 Atl. 391, a school board 
purchased a school site of land which was owned by one 
of its members. The school district paid out the money 
and received the title to the property. Thereafter suit 
was brought by certain taxpayers to set the transaction 
aside. The court in sustaining the transaction said in 
part: 
•' We have, then, the case of a sale of real 
estate where the same person is both vendor and 
vendee. The law under said circumstances is well 
settled. The sale is not void; it is 1nerely void-
able." 
See also Grady v. City of Lit·ingston, (~font.) supra. 
Consideration "\Yill no"\Y be given to the cases cited 
by appellants. Hardy v. 1lfayor of City of Gaines1._;,ille 
(Ga.) 48 S.E. 921, is an action brought by a citizen 
against tlu~ City to enjoin it fron1 perfor1ning a certain 
contract. This is typical of a number of cases "~hich 
will be found in the books "~here a citizen on behalf of a 
municipality and acting for it seeks to enjoin the per-
fornlance of an executorY contract entered into in viola-
tion of some statutory provision~. Ca~Ps of this character 
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are clearly not 'vithin the facts or principles involved 
here. \V e are not dealing with an executory contract but 
a transaction fully perfonned on both sides and which 
has been acted upon by the parties for many years. )lore-
over, the plaintiffs are not seeking to protect any right 
or interest of Davis County but are, as we have shown, 
proceeding against Davis County, seeking to recover the 
property adverse to it. 
ln Githens v. Butler County (l\lo.) 165 S.W. 2d 650, 
the wife of a county judge purchased certain county 
property and thereafter brought suit against the county 
to quiet the title to the same. The county counterclaiined, 
seeking to set aside the deed and tendered into court the 
amount of money paid by the plaintiff in the purchase of 
the property. The court held that because of the relation-
ship of husband and wife under Missouri law, the judge 
had an indirect interest in the prop,erty so purchased 
by his wife of such character that the deed could be set 
aside. In this case, the county felt compelled and the 
court agreed that the county 'vas obligated to pay back 
to the plaintiff the purchase price of the property. This 
could only be on the theory that the purchase was void-
able. Had the purchase been a nullity, the county would 
not have been obligated to pay back the purchase price. 
There is certainly nothing in this case which aids the 
plaintiffs in their suit for the reason, as we have pointed 
out at the outset, they are proceeding not for the benefit 
of the County, but adversely to it. 
Baker v. Scofield, 243 U.S. 114, does not seem to be 
In point. In that case suit \Vas brought by a receiver 
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of a bank to recover back property 'vhich had been 
transferred to a corporation controlled by a prior re-
ceiver and purchased with funds of the bank. The court 
properly held that the property should be recovered back. 
This would appear to be entirely consistent "'ith the 
theory that the deed 'vas voidable and consistent Inore-
over with the proposition that the cause of action to re-
cover the property back belonged to the receiver of the 
bank. By analogy it would appear clear that if there is 
any cause of action here to recover the property from 
Bountiful Livestock Company or its successors, such 
cause of action belongs to Davis County, the party 'vho 
conveyed to Bountiful Livestock Company, and not by 
the plaintiffs here who are actually strangers seeking to 
gain a windfall against Davis County. 
H e1'1J'Yl.essy v. A uto1nobile Owners Insurance Asso-
ciation (Tex.), 282 S.W. 791, is directly contrary to the 
contentions of appellants. There the plaintiff purchased 
a second-hand automobile 'vithout demanding and receiv-
ing the license fee, receipt, or bill of sale required by 
Texas la,v. Thereafter, he sold the car to another, retain-
ing a mortgage to secure payment of the amount o'ving 
to him. The plaintiff likewise failed to transfer and de-
liver to the purchaser the license fee receipt or bill of sale 
at the time he sold the car. Plaintiff obtained an insur-
ance policy on the car to protect his interest therein by 
reason of the mortgage. The ear 'vas stolen and de-
stroyed and plaintiff sought to recover. The t'vo lower 
courts held he was not entitled to do so, but the Supreme 
Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, 
saying in part : 
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~' \Ve cannot agree with the holding that the 
plaintiff in error, Hennessy, got no title to the 
automobile when he purchased it in violation of 
the requiren1ents of the act, and that title did not 
pass to Chisholm on the sale to him. Hennessy ·had 
an insurable interest in the property insured, and 
we recommend that the judg1nents of both the 
courts be reversed, and the cause remanded to the 
district court." 
In Stockton Morris Land Co. v. California Tractor 
& Equipment Corp., (C·al.) 247 P. 2d 90, a tractor com-
pany and a finance company jointly made arrangements 
\vhereby the tractor company sold certain equipment to a 
county and thereafter assigned the contract to the finance 
co1npany. The contract with the county was not executed 
as required by law, and consequently the finance com-
pany could not recover against the county, but brought 
suit against the tractor company under the warranties 
of its assignment. The court held that the finance com-
pany could not recover against the tractor company 
for the simple reason that the finance company had in 
effect joined with the tractor company in selling the 
property to the county. This again is a situation where 
a court denied enforcement of an invalid executory con-
tract. The books are full of such cases but as "\Ve have 
pointed out they have no application here. 
The City of San Diego v. S.an D.iego & Los Angeles 
Railroad Company, supra, is actually an authority in 
favor of respondents because the language of the court 
clearly indicates that a transaction authorized by t'vo 
qualified members of a municipal body may be valid 
even though the third member was disqualified, providing 
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the t\YO qualified n1e1nbers vote in favor of the transac-
tion. 
Tuscan, et al v. Smith, et al., ( 1\Ie.) 153 Atl. :2H9, 
presents a situation in which certain inhabitant~ of a 
to,vn brought suit against certain individuals for the can-
cellation of a lease. This again is a case in 'vhich suit is 
brought on behalf of a town to terminate an executory 
contract. 
In Miller v. 1lfcKinnon, (Cal.) 124 P. 2d 3-!, suit ""as 
brought by a taxpayer on behalf of Santa Clara County 
against the partnership and the members thereof and 
certain county officers to recover money clain1ed to have 
been illegally expended by the county and received by 
the partnership. The contention was that the county 
failed to procure bids for the work as required by statute. 
The case went up on appeal from an order sustaining a 
demurrer to the complaint. The court held that the com-
plaint stated a cause of action. A·gain, this is a typical 
situation in a proceeding directly between the county and 
persons dealing with it. It does not touch a situation 
as presented here, ''"'here the plaintiff seeks to proceed 
adversely against a county in a suit in "'"hich the county 
itself seeks to set aside a deed. 
Appellants quote from 14 Am. Jur., Counties, Sec-
tion -+2, Page 211. The case cited in support of the text 
is Cheney v. Unroe (Ind.) 77 N.E. 1041. In that case 
plaintiff was appointed by the county to superintend some 
high'''"ay construction on its behalf. He was paid for this 
work by the county. In addition to such service for the 
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county, he entered into the employment of the contractor 
on the job at a stipulated sum per day. He sued the 
contractor for his compensation. He thus sought to be 
paid from both sides on the contract. The court held that 
he was not entitled to recover and properly so. 
Appellants also quote from 20 C.J.S., Counties, Sec-
tion 192, Page 1028. The case in support of the text there 
is Logan County v. Edw.ards (Ky.) 266 S.W. 917. In that 
case the county brought suit against Edwards to recover 
certain moneys paid to Edwards upon claims 'vhich were 
approved against the county. It appears that Edvvards 
\Vas former county judge and a member of a fiscal court 
\vhich voted for the allowance of the claims. The claiins 
were in favor of Edwards and a drygoods company, of 
which he was the principal owner. The court held that 
under the Kentucky statute, the allo,vance of the claiins 
were invalid. The case arose on demurrer and the court 
held that the complaint stated a cause of action against 
Edwards. This again is a direct action by the county 
against the former judge. 
This leaves for consideration only the case of Clark 
v. Utah Constru-ction Co. (Idaho) 8 P. 2d 454. In that 
case it appears that Clark as a member of the Board of 
County Commissioners of Ada County, Idaho, executed 
a deed to certain tax property to his wife, Dora A. Clark. 
Because of the community pToperty laws in effect in 
Idaho, the court reached the conclusion that the deed 
from Clark to his wife was in effect a conveyance to 
him of property and void under Idaho la\v. The action 
in question, however, arose under unusual circumstances. 
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Utah Construction Company had been grazing sheep 
on the land in question. Clark as assignee of hi~ wife, 
brought suit against the Construction Company to re-
cover damages for trespass. In order to sustain his right 
to recovery, Clark introduced the deed from himself to 
his wife and an a.ssign1nent from her to him of his clain1 
to recover for the trespass. The validity of the deed to 
Clark's wife was raised as a defense by the Construction 
Company. The Idaho statute made the violation of its 
provisions a felony and further provided that: 
"Every contract made in violation of any of 
the provisions of the two preceding sections may 
be avoided at the instance of any party except the 
officer interested therein." 
Linder these statutory provisions the court held that the 
defendant Construction Company was entitled to assert 
the invalidity of the deed to Clark's ,,~ife. The Court held 
that the plaintiff could not recover against the Construc-
tion Company for the alleged trespass and simply left the 
parties "\vhere it found them. While the court uses broad 
language respecting the invalidity of the deed, there is 
actually nothing in the case which assists the plaintiffs 
in their claim here. Neither the facts or the statutes in-
volved in the Clark case are presented here. :Jioreover, 
it must be manifest that the plaintiffs cannot, for their 
own personal benefit, attack the deed adversely to Davis 
County in the very same suit in which Davis County is 
itself for the public benefit undertaking to assert the 
invalidity of the deed. 
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POINT III. 
IF THE l)l~~ED FROl\1 D1\ \'"1S COUNTY TO 
BOli~rPIFUL LI\TESTOCK COn1PANY IS 
'!(>IDABLE, PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO 
C.:\lTBE OF ACTION TO SET THE DEED 
.:\SIDE. 
\Ve have seen that whether a deed is voidable or void 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 
OnP of the deterrninative facts is who asserts such in-
validity. The problem here i~ not \vhether, as an abstract 
question, the deed from Davis County to Bountiful Live-
~tock Company is invalid. The question is \vhether the 
deed is invalid at the suit of the plaintiffs. That is a 
totally different question from whether the deed may 
be set aside at the suit of Davi~ County. These defend-
ants do not concede that Davis County has any rights to 
set the deed aside, and the trial court ha~ expressly re-
served that question. Whatever result might ultimately 
be reached in the trial of the issues under the cross com-
plaint ,,.e submit that under the alignment of the parties 
and the i~~ues in this case the plaintiffs have no standing 
to ass-ert such invalidity. 
\\ ... e are sure that counsel for appellants have made 
diligent search to find some authority where, under an 
align1nent of parties and \\Tith issues such as are presented 
here, a court has held that parties in the position of 
the~r plaintiffs might assert against the county itself the 
invalidity of a deed such as that delivered to the livestock 
company. From the foregoing analysis it is seen that none 
of the authorities cited by appellant support such a con-
tention. \\r e have found no such case and \ve are sure 
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that no court of last resort has ever so held. All of the 
cases "\Yhich we have found fall into either on,e class or 
another, namely, (i) cases in which a taxpayer is himself 
on behalf of the governmental body, seeking, to prevent 
or set aside some transaction, or ( ii) cases in which the 
governmental body itself has sought to assert some right. 
No case has been found where a person in the position of 
these plaintiffs has been able to assert such a claim ad-
versely to the governmental body. 
POINT IV. 
IN NO EVENT niAY THE PLAINTIFFS RE-
COVER IN THIS CASE. 
(a) Plaintiffs Can Succeed Only on the Strength 
of Their Own Title. 
Whether these proceedings are viewed as an action 
to quiet title or an equitable suit to redeem, or however 
viewed, the plaintiffs are in effect seeking to establish 
and quiet their title against the claims of all the defend-
ants including Davis County. It is therefore necessary 
to consider the nature of the burden "\vhich rests upon the 
plaintiffs and the proof which must be made "\vith respect 
to the title which they claim to the property in question. 
The rule has been announced in a host of cases and 
now constitutes a "\veil ·established principle 'vhich has 
acquirPd the force of a maxim, that in suits to determine 
adverse claims to property a plaintiff can recover only 
on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness 
of the title of his adversary. This proposition has been 
often recognized by this Court. See Cottrell v. Pickering, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
~t~ Utah 62, 88 Pac. 696; Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 l~tah 
10, 94 P.2d 862; Mercur Coalition Jlining Co. v. Gannon, 
ct al., 11~ Utah 13, 184 P. 2d 341 and Lyman v. National 
Jlortgage Bond Corporation, 7 Utah 2d 123, 320 P. 2d 
3~2, \Yhere at page 127 of the lTtah Report, the rule i~ 
stated to be that : 
". . . Plaintiffs must succeed on the strength 
of their own claim and not alone on the weak-
ness of the defendant's claim in order to succeed 
" 
The foregoing rule is particularly important in the 
disposition of the issues involved here as w·e shall here-
after demonstrate. 
(b) Whether the Deed from Davis County to 
Bountiful Livestock Company is Void or 
Voidable, Plaintiffs are now Barred from 
Instituting this Action by Reason of the 
Provisions of the Special Statutes of Limit-
tion Relating to Tax Titles. 
In 1951, the Legislature, by Chapter 19, Laws of 
1951, enacted five sections, being designated as 78-12-
5.1, 78-12-5.2, 78-12-5.3, 78-12-7.1 and 78-12-12.1 1961 
Pocket Supplement to Volu1ne 9, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. The first case under the 1951 statute was Hansen 
v. Jf orris, 3 Utah 2d 311, 283 P. 2d 884, in which this 
Court held the Act to be constitutional and sustained a 
tax title. The next case was Peterson v. Callister, 
6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P. 2d 814. In the second case, suit 
'vas brought by a tax title holder to quiet the title. 
Although it appeared that the auditor's deed to the county 
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and the deed out from the county were defective, the 
court sustained the tax title. 
The next case which came before this Court \\Ta~ 
Lynutn v. Nat,ional Mortgage Bond Corporation, supra. 
In both Han.sen v. Morris, and Peterson v. Callister, 
supra, the plaintiff was the tax title holder seeking to 
fluiet his title against the old owner. This 'vas likewise 
the situation in LynLan v. National Mortgage Bond Cor-
poration. In the present cases, the situation is re-
versed. The old O"'\vner is seeking to recover title against 
the County and its grantee. 
\Vhile, as pointed out herein, "'\Ye have no quarrel 
"\vith the decisions in the foregoing three cases, the align-
ment of the parties makes a fundamental difference in 
the cases in view of the foregoing rule that the plaintiffs 
must rely upon the strength of their own title and not 
upon the weakness of the title of the defendants. 
Before considering these three cases further, it is 
necessary to observe the scope of the five sections em-
bodied in the 1951 Act. These sections covered three sub-
jects, namely, (i) limitations of actions, (ii) adverse pos-
session, and (iii) definition of terms. The t"\YO sections 
dealing with limitations of actions are designated in said 
Pocket Part to said \T olume 9, as Sections 78-12-5.1 and 
78-12-5.2 and provide as follo"'\vs: 
"78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession "\Yithin seven 
years - Proviso - Tax title. - No action for the 
recovery of real property or for the possession 
thereof shall be maintained, unless the plaintiff 
or his predecessor "\vas seized or possessed of such 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
propPrty within seven years fron1 the coinmence-
Inent of such action; provided, ho\v·ever, that 'vith 
respect to actions or defenses brought or inter-
posed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet 
title or determine the o\vnership of real property 
against the holder of a tax title to such property, 
no such action or defense shall be commenced or 
intPrposed more than four years after the date 
of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating 
such tax title unless the person co1nmencing or 
interposing such action or defense or his pre-
decessor has actually occupied or been in posses-
sion of such property within four years prior to 
the commencement or interposition of such action 
or defense or within one year from the effective 
date of this amendment." 
H 78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title- Limitations 
of action or defense - Proviso. - No action or 
defense for the recovery or possession of real 
property or to quiet title or determine the owner-
ship thereof shall be commenced or interposed 
against the holder of a tax title after the expira-
tion of four years from the date of the sale con-
veyance or transfer of such tax title to any county, 
or directly to any other purchase thereof at any 
public or private tax sale and after the expiration 
of one year from the date of this act. Provided, 
ho\YeYer, that this section shall not bar any action 
or defense by the O\vner of the legal title to such 
property where he or his predecessor has actually 
occupied or been in actual possession of such prop-
erty 'vithin four years from the commencement or 
interposition of such action or defense. And pro-
vided further, that this section shall not bar any 
defense by a city or to\vn, to an action by the 
holder of a tax title, to the effect that such cj t:v 
or to,vn holds a lien again:;.:t such property 'vhich 
is equal or superior to the claim of the holder of 
such tax title." 
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The two sections dealing with acquisition of title 
by adverse possession are designated in said Pocket Part 
as Sections 78-12-7.1 and 78-12-12.1 and provide as fol-
lows: 
"78-12-7.1 Adverse possession - Presumption 
- Proviso - Tax title. - In every action for the re-
covery or possession of real property or to quiet 
title to or determine the owner thereof the person 
establishing a legal title to such property shall 
be presumed to have been possessed thereof with-
in the time required by law; and the occupation 
of such property by any other person shall be 
deemed to have been under and in subordination 
to the legal title, unless it appears that such prop-
erty has been held and possessed adversely to 
such legal title for seven years before the com-
mencement of such action. Provided, however, 
that if in any action any party shall establish 
prima facie evidence that he is the owner of any 
real property under a tax title held by him and his 
predecessors for four years prior to the com-
mencement of such action and one year after the 
effective date of this amendment he shall be pre-
sumed to be the owner of such property by adverse 
possession unless it appears that the owner of the 
legal title or his predecssor has actually occupied 
or been in possession of such property under such 
title or that such tax title owner and his predeces-
sors have failed to pay all the taxes levied or 
assessed upon such property 'vi thin such four year 
period." 
"78-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes 
- Proviso - Tax title. - In no case shall adverse 
possession be established under the provisions of 
this ·Code, unless it shall be sho"\\rn that the land 
has been occupied and claimed for the period of 
seven years continuously, and that the party, his 
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predecessors and grantors have paid all the taxes 
which have been levied and assessed upon such 
land according to law. Provided, however, that 
payment by the holder of a tax title to real prop-
erty or his predecessors, of all the taxes levied and 
assessed upon such real property after the delin-
quent tax sale or transfer under which he claims 
for a period of not less than four years and for 
not less than one year after the effective date of 
this amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of this section in regard to the pay-
ment of taxes necessary to establish adverse pos-
session." 
The section dealing with the definition of terins is 
78-12-5.3 of said Pocket Part and defines "action" as 
follows: 
"* * * the word 'action' as used in this section 
includes counterclaims and cross-complaints, and 
all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is 
sought." 
The term "action" would therefore clearly include 
these proceedings, however they are designated. 
In Hansen v. Morris, S1tpra, this Court considered 
said Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.3, sustained the con-
stitutionality of the Act and held that where the tax 
title holder sought to quiet title, he was obligated as part 
of his case to plead and prove possession and payment of 
taxes for four years prior to the commencement of the 
action. 
The same sections were under consideration in Peter-
son v. Callister, supra. There, ho·w·ever, the deed to the 
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county "\\Tas incomplete and lacked certain fonnalities 
required by law. The Court answered these contentions 
'vith the observation that it 'vas not necessary that title 
pass to protect the tax title claimant, particularly in 
view of the fact that defendant had notice of plaintiff 'R 
occupancy of the property. 
In Lyman v. Na.tional Mortgage Bond Corporation, 
supra, while the plaintiff proved possession for four 
years, he failed to prove payment of taxes for the four-
year period. Plaintiff showed redempt.ion of taxes for the 
four-year period but the Court held on the authority of 
Bowen v. Olsen, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P. 2d 983, that the 
statute required payment and not redemption. Therefore 
the Court held that plaintiff failed to make out a case. 
There is nothing in the Lyman case which helps the plain-
tiffs here, for there is no dispute to the fact that defend-
ants Bountiful Livestock Company, Salt Lake Pipeline 
Company and Salt Lake Refining Company have been 
in possession of the property since 1943 and paid all taxes 
thereon since 1944. 
Turning to the case at bar, it is seen that plaintiffs 
as prior owners of the property are completely barred 
from prosecuting this action under said Section 78-12-5.1 
and 78-12-5.2 unless they were in possession of the prop-
erty 'vi thin four years prior to the commencement of suit. 
The plaintiffs do not allege possession or payment of 
taxes within the four-year period prior to the commence-
ment of the action. On the contrary, the complaints of 
the plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendant 
Bountiful Livestock Company took possession of and 
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has ever since said purported sale had the use and benefit 
an(l O<'('Upation of said land. (R. 2, -!7) It is submitted 
that sueh allegations and proof are essential under the 
provisions of the foreging statutes of limitation and are 
a part of plain tiffs' case and in the absence of such 
allegations and in the face of the admitted fact to the 
contrary, these plaintiffs cannot recover. 
Plaintiffs assert that the tax sale proceedings are 
fatally defective within the rule announced in Telonis v. 
Staley, 104 Utah 557, 144 P. 2d 513. It is admitted that 
the County Auditor failed to attach the affidavit to the 
a8~essment rolls. This, however, is immaterial to this 
ea~e. The doctrine of Telonis v. Staley and other cases 
along the same line is now all water under the judicial 
bridge. The same argument was urged in Hansen v. 
ill orris and Peterson v. Callister, supra, and brushed 
aside by the Court upon the ground that it is now im-
material that defects arose in the tax proceedings. It is 
further immaterial that title may never have actually 
pa~sed from the plaintiffs. 
(c) In Any Event, the Deed from Davis County 
to Bountiful Livestock Company is a Writ-
ten Instrument upon which Bountiful Live-
stock Company an its Successors can found 
a Defense based upon Adverse Possession. 
The rule is now too well established in Utah to admit 
of any doubt that a tax title deed fro1n a county, although 
substantially defective, is a \vritten instrument upon 
\\Thich adverse possession may be founded. This propo-
~ition \Ya~ established in Welner v. Stearns, ±0 Utah 185, 
120 Pac. 490, and has consistently been followed by this 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 
Court in several decisions. In the Stearns case1 purchase 
agreement was made with the county, thereafter followed 
by deed. The title of the county was substantially defec-
tive, ho\vever, the Court held that adverse possession 
against the old owner commenced on the date of the con-
tract and the entry into possession thereunder and the 
fact that the deed to the county was defective was not 
material. At page 195 and 196 of the Utah Report, the 
Court held as follows : 
"In the case at bar, as \Ve have seen, the 
county claimed title under a tax deed, and hence 
claimed from a source other than that through 
which the respondent Borg claims. For the pur-
pose of meeting the presumption that appellant 
took and remained in possession in subordination 
of the paper title, it is immaterial that the tax 
deed was defective, and did not in law convey an 
indefeasible title. Appellant's possession was just 
as much adverse to Borg's title, although the deed 
was defective, as it would have been if the deed 
had conveyed a perfect title; the only difference 
being that under a deed \vhich is defective the 
claimant in possession must obtain the title, if he 
obtains it at all, by virtue of the statute, w·hile if 
the deed is good, and conveys an indefeasible title, 
the title is in him from the time the deed is de-
livered." 
1 t is of the utmost importance, too, to recognize the 
further proposition established in the Stearns case, 
namely, that when the period of redemption has expired 
and a tax deed has issued, the county thereafter holds 
under a new title and any possession or act of dominion 
taken by the county under such new title is adverse to the 
original owner. Consequently, when the new title arises, 
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and the county undertakes to deal with the property, 
adverse possession commences to run against the old 
0\Vner. rrhis proposition is further demonstrated and 
affirrned in Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P. 
2d 239, hereinafter considered. 
W elner v. Stearns, stttpra, was followed by Baker v. 
Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 Pac. 117. In the Goodman 
case a parcel of land was sold to Goodman by the county 
under a deed which was asserted to be a mere nullity 
and in answering this contention this Court at page 355 
of the Utah Report said: 
"The tax deed in question, even though it be 
held to be defective, was sufficient to give color 
of title. This is the well-established law of this 
state. W elner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 Pac. 
490, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1175." 
In the Slechta case, supra, the facts were that the 
county leased the property to a tenant and thereafter 
sold the property to a purchaser. The purchaser had not 
been in possession and paid taxes for the seven years 
statutory period but if the period during which the tenant 
\vas in possession was added, the seven-year requirement 
\vas complied with. The question was then whether 
the adverse possession commenced when the tenant was 
placed in possession by the county. It was the appellant's 
contention that because of admitted defects in the tax 
sale and May sale, the possession which the county took 
of the property through its tenant "\vas in subordination 
and not adverse to the right of the old owner and that 
therefore there had not been adverse possession of the 
property for a period of more than seven years before 
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the commencement of the action. This Court at page 378 
of the Utah Report meets the contention of the old O\vner 
as follows: 
"This case, therefore, rather than being an 
aid to appellant's contention that the actual physi-
cal possession which the county took of the prop-
erty through its tenants \vas in subordination to 
the rights of the record owner, is 1nore pursuasive 
for the proposition that the county took possession 
by virtue of its purported ownership of the land. 
Issuance of an auditor's tax deed did not give the 
county possession. It was the act of placing ten-
ants in actual possession which initiated posses-
sion by the county. The fact that the auditor's 
deed was invalid and the further fact that because 
of the invalidity of the May sale a further period 
of redemption was vouchsafed to the record owner 
does not change the character and nature of the 
possession asserted through tenants from being 
one under a claim of ownership. At the time \Yhen 
the county took possession of the property it did 
so claiming that it had a valid title, there having 
been an attempt to comply with all the provisions 
relating to tax sales. The fact that there were de-
fects in the proceedings did not change the nature 
of the county's clain1. It \vas open, hostile and 
adverse to the record owner's right. See W elner 
v. Stearns et al., 40 Utah 185 120 P. 490, Ann. Cas. 
191-±,C, 1175." 
T"ro rules of lR\\T are established by this series of 
cases, namely, (i) a tax deed from a county, however 
defective, is an instrument in \vriting sufficient under the 
adverse possession statutes, and (ii) \vhen the county 
receives a tax deed to property, ho\vever defective, this 
beco1nes a source of a new claim of title and \Yhen the 
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('ounty, acting on the basis of this ne'v clain1, undertakes 
to dPal \Vith the property and assert dominion over 
the ~ain<?, its aet in so doing starts the period running 
for adver~P po~ses~ion against the old O\\·ner. 
Applying the second proposition to this case, it is 
clPar that 'vhen Davis County entered into the contract of 
~ale covering the premises in question, it did so under 
its elaim of title and its act of placing the purchaser 
in possession under the contract "\vas open, hostile and 
adverse to the old owner's rights and the period of ad-
verse possession then commenced to run against the old 
O\\·ners. 
Turning to our statutes relating to adverse posses-
sion, it is seen from Section 78-12-8 and 78-12-9, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, that where one founds a claim 
upon a "\vritten instrument it must be an instrument as a 
conveyance of the property in question or upon a decree 
or judgment of a court. Accordingly, "rhere one holds 
under a deed "\vhich purports to pass title but does not 
do so, he holds under color of title under l'tah la"\v. This 
i~ in aeeordance with the weight of authority in the 
United ~tates. The rule is stated in 1 A1n. Jur., Sections 
196 and 197, as follows: 
'"It has been stated heretofore that 'color of 
title' is title in appearance only; it is not title 
in fact. Generally speaking, any instrument, how-
ever defective or imperfect, and no matter from 
w·hat cause invalid, purporting to convey the land, 
and showing the extent of the tenant's claim, may 
be color of title; a claim to the land thereunder 
will draw to the claimant the protection of the 
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Statute of Limitations if the other requisites of 
adverse possession are present.'' 
"The very act of claiming title by virtue of 
an adverse possession for the statutory period 
precludes the idea of a valid paper title, as do 
the words 'color of title.' It is evident, therefore, 
that the requirements as to color of title are suffi-
ciently complied with by a possession held under 
an instrument \Vhich, as a conveyance, is in fact 
either voidable or void." 
Nor is it necessary under Utah law that the holder 
under the instrument act in good faith. In this case, 
there is no evidence that Bountiful Livestock Company 
did not act in good faith and any assertion to the con-
trary is \vithout merit. However, good faith is not a re-
quisite element in order to initiate and establish a new 
title by adverse possession under Utah la\v. Open, con-
tinuous adverse possession for the statutory period is 
all that is required. See "The Adverse Possession of 
Land Titles in Utah," Volume 3, Number 3, Page 294, 
Utah Law Review, where Professor Montgomery states 
the rule to be that : 
"The second principal element of an adverse 
possession is the formulation of the proper mental 
attitude. This is not to suggest, however, that the 
claimant must act in good faith for, wl1ile it may 
be a somewhat shocking concept that one can by 
the combined use of force, fraud, and deceit ac-
quire title to the land of another by adverse pos-
session, in the absence of a statutory provision 
to the contrary, good faith is entirely unneces-
sary." 
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The rule which prevails in Utah as established by 
many cases is that possession must be op.en, notorious, 
continuous, exclusive and adverse. See Cooper v. Carter 
Oil Company, 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P. 2d 320, and Bozievich 
v. Slechta, supra. Nothing more is required. By advanc-
ing the foregoing propositions, we do not admit that a 
deed from the County to Bountiful Livestock Company 
failed to pass title to the grantee. If it should be so 
determined, it was, however, clearly sufficient to consti-
tute color of title under our adverse possession statute. 
(d) Plaintiffs are now Barred by the General 
Adverse Possession Statutes. 
Defendants have pleaded the adverse possession 
statutes in defense. Adverse possession may be used by 
a defendant either as a shield ·or a sword. In other 
words, defendants may assert adverse possession to de-
feat the claim of the plaintiff or affirmatively to quiet 
their own title. See 1 Am. J ur., Adverse Possession, 
Sections 15 and 16. Defendants have elected to employ 
the defense as a shield. Although defendants have 
pleaded these statutes as a defense, they did not need to 
do so. The defense is available simply under a denial of 
plaintiffs' title. See 1 Am. Jur., Adverse Possession, 
Section 235. 
Prior to the 1951 Amendment, a period of seven 
years was required for adverse possession. However, un-
der the foregoing Sections 78-12-7.1, and 78-12-12.1, this 
4as been shortened to four years, where claim is made 
under a tax title. In this case, Bountiful Livestock Com-
pany prior to its deed to the pipeline company had held 
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for much more than the seven-year period. So it becomes 
immaterial which period is applied. 
It is admitted here that taxes have been continually 
vaid since 19±4 and that these defendants have been in 
adverse possession since 19±3. The plaintiffs affirma-
tively allege such possession as hereinabove set forth 
and seek to recover the value of the use and occupation 
of the land. The sufficiency of the adverse possession 
of Bountiful Livestock Company is admitted and it is 'veil 
within the rule announced by this Court in Cooper v. Car-
ter Oil Company, supra. 
(e) The Bar which Prevents Plaintiffs from Re-
covery against Bountiful Livestock Com-
pany, Salt Lake Pipeline Company and Salt 
Lake Refining Company Likewise Bars the 
Plaintiffs from any Recovery against Davis 
County. 
The plaintiffs assert that the judgment entered by 
the Court in this case precludes them from the exercise 
of a right which they assert to recover the property 
against Davis County. The contention of the plaintiff::; 
appears to be grounded upon the assun1ption that if 
plaintiffs cannot recover the property in a direct attack 
upon the transaction between Davis County and Bounti-
ful Livestock Company they should nevertheless be en-
titled to recover the property indirectly in the event that 
Davis County succeeds under its cross-complaint against 
the defendant livestock company and its grantees. 
For the purpose of testing the merit of such conten-
tion, and without admitting any rights of Davis County 
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to l'P('over und(~r its cross-cornplaint, let it be assurned 
that Davis County succeeds under its cross-complaint 
and recovers the property against Bountiful Livestock 
Cornpany and it~ grantees, ean the plaintiffs in any event 
then rPeover the prernises from Davis County~ It is 
submitted the plaintiffs could not so recover, for the 
following reasons. 
Under the doctrine announced in the Slechta case, 
::;upra, "~hen Davis County undertook to deal with the 
property as its own, placing the livestock company in pos-
session under the contract, and most assuredly when it 
dPecled the property to Bountiful Livestock Company, 
the statute of limitations began to run against the old 
o\vner~ and now precludes them from recovery. As 
against these plaintiffs this limitation runs in favor not 
only of the livestock company and its grantee, but also 
in favor of Davis County. !ioreover, if the deed frorn 
Davis County to the livestock company failed to pass title 
to the latter or if Davis County may for any reason be 
able to set that deed aside still plaintiffs are barred 
from recovery under the rule announced in Slechtrt, 
c-..·upra. For under that rule the act of the County in plac-
ing a tenant in possession starts the statute running 
against the old O\\Tner. If the County were able to set 
a~ide its deed to the livestock company and recover back 
the property the livestock company and its grantees 
\vould nevertheless during all their period of occupancy 
be tenants at \vill of the County. l\Iany decisions support 
this proposition. In Tate v. Gai-nes (Okla.) 105 Pac. 193, 
the Court states the rule as follows: 
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"It has been uniformly held that possession 
under an invalid conveyance or contract of sale 
creates a tenancy at "Till, and where a tenant goes 
into possession under an invalid lease his tenancy 
at its inception is merely a tenancy at 'vill. ... So, 
while the conveyance was wholly void and of no 
effect in itself, the possession of the grantee 
amounted to a tenancy at will, not made so by the 
void conveyance, but because out of the effort to 
deal came a permission to enter the land relieving 
grantee of the imputation of and liability for tres. 
pass." 
To the same effect see : Hall v. Wall ace (Cal.) 26 Pac. 360; 
Packard v. RaiJlroad Co. (Ill.) 46 Ill. App. 2-±-±; Lehman 
v. Nolti,r,ig (~{o.) 56 ~Io. App. 549; Howard v. Merriam 
(Mass.) 5 Cush 583; Mcintosh v. Lee (Io,va) 10 N.W. 
895; Peters v. Holder (Okla.) 136 Pac. 400. 
It is asserted by the plaintiffs that should the deed 
from Davis County to Bountiful Livestock Company 
be for any reason set aside and should Davis County re-
cover back the property, it would then be holding the 
premises in trust for the plaintiffs. Such a contention 
is manifestly "rithout merit, for under the rule announced 
in Slechta, supra, the assertion of title by the County 
when it places the buyer in possession is adverse to the 
claim of the old o"'"ner and sweeps away any vestige of 
trust relationship. 
CON,CL US ION 
The judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit of 
these plaintiffs against all defendants must be affirmed 
for the reasons that: (i) The deed from Davis County 
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to the livestock company is valid, ( ii) Even though in-
valid, the deed is voidable and not void, (iii) If voidable, 
the right to avoid the deed belongs to the County and 
not to the livestock company, (iv) In any event the stat-
utP~ of limitation~ and of adverse possession applicable 
in this case and the decisions of the Courts construing 
the same preclude these plaintiffs from any recovery. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. N. CORNWALL 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & 1IcCARTHY 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Bountiful Livestock Compa;ny, 
Salt Lake Pipel~ne Company, 
and Salt Lake Refining Company 
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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